A number of behavioral finance theories posit that investors adhere to prior beliefs in spite of new information. This paper reports the results of an investment experiment which shows that subjects' inferences are biased by their prior beliefs in a manner that depends on investment outcomes. Specifically, their perception of new information was more positively biased for their prior favored assets when incurring losses than gains. This asymmetric bias may help explain empirical patterns such as loser momentum and suggests modifications to models of belief persistence in markets.
Introduction
One of the main hypotheses of behavioral finance is that biased inferences can lead to suboptimal investment behavior and anomalous market pricing. Academic finance is currently faced with the challenge of distinguishing between several potential explanations, both behavioral and rational, for a number of documented anomalies. Our experiment also observes inferences related to investments and, in particular, investigates the self-serving persistence of beliefs. One motivation for studying this issue comes from behavioral finance theories which conjecture that investors adhere to prior beliefs in spite of new information. For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) posit that investors overreact to information that confirms prior beliefs and underreact to information that contradicts them, which leads to momentum in asset prices. In addition, behavioral models of overconfidence (Odean, 1998 ) and conservatism (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) have the feature that investors adhere excessively to previously formed beliefs.
In our experiment, we test for the presence of several belief persistence biases in a simple investment game. Subjects in our game placed bets on which of two stocks 1 For example, there are numerous explanations for momentum in stock prices as documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Behavioral explanations include Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) , and Grinblatt and Han (2005) 3 (e.g., Dell or Apple) would have a higher return in the subsequent week. Specifically, they allocated funds to a double-or-nothing bet that their favored stock would outperform the other, and this game was played repeatedly over six weeks. We also asked subjects to forecast their probability of winning this bet in addition to asking them to characterize new information regarding these stocks as good, bad, or neutral if they had observed any. This simplified investment setting allowed us to clearly observe relative disposition toward stocks and the processing of subsequent information.
In this setting, we test for the presence of three self-serving belief persistence biases documented in cognitive psychology whereby people accept favorable information and refute unfavorable information. The first is confirmatory bias which refers to the tendency to accept information that confirms prior beliefs and refute information that contradicts them as documented in studies such as Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) . The second is that of self-attribution bias whereby people's belief in their own ability persists over time. Namely, people attribute success to ability and failure to bad luck as conjectured in the investment models of Gervais and Odean (2001) .
In addition, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) employ self-attribution bias as the source of belief persistence in their model of momentum. Finally, we test whether either of these biases is impacted by the concept of motivated reasoning (e.g., Kunda, 1987) whereby people passively accept desirable information but actively scrutinize undesirable information in order to contradict it. This tendency applies to both confirmatory bias and self-attribution biases or inferences about external and internal attributes, respectively. Its predictions are more specific, however, implying that distortions will be greater for bad news (losses) than good news (gains).
We hypothesize that subjects should exhibit confirmatory bias and motivated reasoning such that their news reports for their prior favored stock (i.e., the stock they bet would outperform) should be positively biased while reports for their nonfavored 4 stock (i.e., the stock they bet would underperform) should be negatively biased. We find that subjects' reports were positively biased for their favored stock but only for losses and not gains. If subjects process information rationally, they should report news about their prior favored stock as being better when winning than when losing the bet since this stock does better, on average, in the former case. In contrast, subjects in our experiment reported significantly better news about their favored stock, on average, when losing than when winning. In addition, they did not report their nonfavored stock as having significantly better news than their favored stock when losing the bet even though the nonfavored stock was outperforming the favored.
Overall, our results indicate that subjects engaged in motivated reasoning to justify their prior choice of favored stock, i.e., they actively distorted new information about this stock more for losses than gains. They did not seem to engage in this biased reasoning regarding the nonfavored stock, however, indicating that that they framed their decision as choosing a good stock rather than avoiding a bad one.
In addition, there is evidence that these biases affected not only stated perceptions but also subsequent investment behavior in our experiment. In contrast, we study persistence in subjects' beliefs related to their stock-picking ability and find no evidence of biased self-attribution as conjectured in the aforementioned investment models.
These findings are important because they indicate that these models of biased belief persistence in investments need to be modified. The model of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), for example, should focus on inferences about assets and not on self-attribution bias, for which we find no evidence. In addition, it should capture investor's assymetric distortion for gains and losses whereas their model has a symmetric distortion. In other words, investors in their model overreact to confirming information as much as they underreact to contradictory information, 5 creating equal momentum in positive and negative return directions. Our results indicate that investors beliefs should be more persistent when losing money so that momentum ought to be stronger for loser than winner stocks. Several papers have documented the fact that momentum is driven primarily by persistence in losers (e.g., Chan, 2003; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, 2006) . Though some studies have argued that this "loser momentum" persists because of short-sales contraints on arbitrageurs (e.g., Ali and Trombley, 2006) , others argue that the profitability of momentum strategies remains economically significant even after accounting for these costs (e.g., Bushee and Raedy, 2005). Our results suggest that motivated reasoning in investments may also contribute to slow incorporation of information for loser stocks.
Our findings may help explain other empirical patterns as well. For example, some researchers have asserted that self-justification in the face of losses makes investors reluctant to sell loser stocks, causing the well-known disposition effect (e.g., Zuchel, 2001 ). Our finding of motivated reasoning in investment behavior and inferences provides further evidence in support of this hypothesis. Finally, this experiment suggests new predictions related to market patterns. For instance, short-sellers ought to be more reluctant to accept good news than bad about their shorted stocks since this positive news causes them to lose money. Hence, one testable implication of our experimental results is that stocks with higher short interest should exhibit stronger momentum in the positive return direction as a result of short sellers' motivated reasoning.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 outlines the experimental method. Section 4 describes our experimental hypotheses and results while section 5 concludes. No experiments have yet studied the persistence of inferences in an investment setting in spite of evidence from experimental psychology of excessive adherence to prior beliefs and financial market theories based on these biases. Behavioral models of overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Odean, 1998 ) and conservatism (Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998), for example, have the feature that investors adhere excessively to previously formed beliefs. This adherence generates underreaction to new information and return drift in asset prices. The principal be-7 havioral theory of belief persistence in markets is that of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) . Their model posits that the bias of overreacting to information that confirms prior beliefs while underreacting to information that refutes them can lead to momentum in asset prices. The bias in their model specifically takes the form of biased self-attribution whereby people attribute past success to ability and failure to bad luck. This tendency has been documented in numerous psychological studies including Fischhoff (1982) , Langer and Roth (1975) , and Taylor and Brown (1988).
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This bias could also equivalently take the form of confirmatory bias, which refers to the process whereby an individual interprets ambiguous evidence as confirmation of his or her hypothesis. Confirmatory biases were first documented by Wason (1960) and have since been studied extensively in the context of processing new information for forming political opinions on the death penalty (Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979) , the safety of nuclear technology (Plous, 1991) , and social stereotypes (Darley and Gross, 1983) . Motivated reasoning provides another framework for how both prior beliefs and preferences can distort subsequent inferences, which predicts that people are less critical of information which supports desired or existing beliefs than information which is inconsistent with such beliefs. This framework implies that people exert more effort to distort undesirable than desirable information. While motivated reasoning as a cognitive bias has become an integral part of the psychology literature in studies such as Kunda (1987 Kunda ( , 1990 , Ditto and Lopez (1992), Ditto, et al. (1998, 2003) , it has been largely ignored in the field of behavioral finance.
Our paper is closely related to that of Hales (2006) , which studies motivated reasoning in an accounting environment. In his experiment, subjects forecast the earnings of an unknown NYSE firm in which they were exogenously given either a long or short position. Hales' analysis finds that subject forecasts were affected in a manner consistent with motivated reasoning. Namely, their forecasts were more biased, either upward for long positions and downward for short positions, when they faced a loss on their investment position than when they faced a gain. Our experiment differs in several important ways. First, Hales' experiment examines a single-period setting with exogenous positions whereas our experiment simulates actual investment in that subjects have endogenous positions in a multi-period setting. Our experiment also allows us to study whether stated perceptions affect actual investment behavior.
Specifically, we can observe in our dynamic investment game how investment decisions and outcomes in one week influence both perceptions and investment behavior in the following week.
There are a number of other cognitive biases related to the ones studied in this paper. For example, Seybert and Bloomfield (2008) study wishful thinking whereby people overestimate the probability of desirable events and find that this bias is exacerbated in a market setting. Our paper is also related to the literature on entrapment, escalating commitment, and sunk cost which causes people to maintain or increase their commitment to losing courses of action. Psychologists attribute this tendency to cognitive dissonance, i.e., a reluctance to admit that past decisions were incorrect.
Several researchers have proposed that this self-justification makes investors persist in holding losing positions, causing the disposition effect (e.g., Zuchel, 2001 , and Weber and Camerer, 1998). Our finding of motivated reasoning in investment behavior and inferences lends further support to this hypothesis.
One noteworthy experimental study of the disposition effect by Weber and Welfens (2007) finds results, however, that seem to contradict ours. Namely, prices in their experiment underreact more to good news than to bad news in contrast to our results.
We conjecture that these results are obtained because of the experiment's simplistic 9 and symmetric information structure where subjects are not required to interpret any subjective information. Market outcomes are consequently the result of non-standard preferences rather than distorted information processing. For this reason, the authors come to the counterfactual conclusion that momentum ought to be stronger for positive than negative return news in contradiction with known empirics.
Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of an investment game and related questions administered on a website and repeated each week over six weeks. We performed the experiment twice, once in the fall semester from November 3 until December 14 of 2003 and once in the spring semester from March 1 until April 18 of 2004. There were 33 subjects in the fall and 63 subjects in the spring who played the game. All subjects were either MBA or undergraduate students in finance classes at Penn State University.
The investment game consisted of a portfolio allocation decision where each week subjects were endowed with 1000 points ($10 USD), which they could allocate between two double-or-nothing bets and cash. The first bet was called the "stock bet" where subjects were given a pair of stocks and could bet on which of the two stocks would have a higher return in the subsequent week. If they picked the correct stock, they would double the money allocated to this bet. The website provided information on outcomes and earnings from prior weeks as well as links to the Yahoo! finance pages for the two stocks of the stock bet although there were no restrictions on information subjects could use. The "chance bet" served as a benchmark bet and was an i.i.d. double-or-nothing bet with a 50% chance of winning or losing, based upon the powerball lottery drawing of the subsequent week. Subjects could allocate their money in any way between these two bets and cash except that shortsales were restricted. They were reallocated 1000 points each week, and profits from one week were not rolled over into the next. We paid subjects the sum of their earnings (bet earnings plus cash) over the six weeks in one lump sum after the end of the experiment.
After subjects made their portfolio decisions, they answered a series of questions on the website. First, subjects were asked to provide their subjective probability that their favored stock would outperform the other, to which they could also answer "no opinion," as a measure of confidence in stock selection. Second, they were asked to characterize any new information they had observed in each stock with the following choices: good new information, bad new information, neutral new information, and no new information observed. am. Subjects could, therefore, make their decisions for the current bet t either on a weekday while the prior bet t-1 was still unresolved or on the weekend after the prior bet had been determined. We chose this design in order to reduce the chance that subjects would forget to play the game by maximizing the window of time over which they could make decisions. Our results only rely on the fact that subjects could observe a significant portion of the information about the performance of their stocks and their prior bet (although not necessarily the complete information until the end of the week) when they registered their final responses. We find that subject news reports and betting decisions were significantly related to the stock returns and game outcomes of the current week as discussed in the subsequent sections. Hence, we can conclude that the preponderance of final responses were made with a significant portion of information about bet outcomes.
The two stocks in each stock pair were matched to have similar risk characteristics in order to remove any differences in expected return or predictability in their relative returns. Specifically, we included all stock pairs listed on CRSP which were in the same industry according to their 3-digit SIC code as well as the same quintile among CRSP stocks for their three-factor loadings and their three-factor squared residual based on regressions of monthly returns from the prior sixty months of available data. 4 There were 9 pairs in the fall study and 8 pairs in the spring with one overlapping pair between the semesters, which are listed in table 1. Each subject in the sample was given the same pair of stocks to bet on every week.
Experimental Results
We employ "repeated measures" analysis to analyze our data involving panels of repeated observations over time for each subject. Specifically, we first obtain one observation per subject by computing time-series averages of a dependent variable.
We then test hypotheses on cross-sectional averages across subjects. This procedure is used to simplify the analysis and employ standard t-tests without having to account for correlations within subject observations across different weeks. Smaller average allocations were made in cash and the chance bet of 35% and 20%, respectively. There was significant participation in the stock bet, therefore, as 90 of 96 total subjects allocated a non-zero amount to this bet for at least one week. In addition, the average change in stock, chance, and cash allocations from the prior week are all statistically insignificant. Hence, subjects did not substantially change their allocations over time unconditionally in our sample.
News Reporting

Hypotheses
We conjecture that subjects should exhibit confirmatory biases and motivated reasoning, perceiving new information as justifying their prior choice of stock. If subjects were to choose Dell (their favored stock) over Apple (their nonfavored stock) in their stock bet, for example, their subsequent news reports should be positively biased for Dell and negatively biased for Apple. We first consider the benchmark case when subjects process information rationally. In this case, we should observe the following patterns:
• R1 : If subjects are rational, they should report news about their prior favored stock as being better than news about their prior nonfavored stock when winning the stock bet. They should also report news about their favored stock as being worse than about their nonfavored stock when losing.
• R2 : If subjects are rational, they should report news about their prior favored stock to be better when winning than when losing the stock bet. They should also report news about their nonfavored stock to be better when losing than when winning.
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A pictorial depiction is shown in figure 3 . R1 is obtained because the prior favored stock outperforms the nonfavored stock when the subject wins the bet while the favored stock underperforms the nonfavored stock when the subject loses. R2 is obtained because the favored stock does better while the nonfavored stock does worse, on average, when subjects win than when they lose the bet.
If subjects exhibit these biases, they should accept news that confirms prior beliefs and refute news that contradicts them. Namely, subjects should accept the news that their favored stock is outperforming their nonfavored stock when winning the bet while not accepting the news that their favored stock is underperforming when losing. Hence, confirmatory bias should imply that:
• H1 : Subjects report news about their prior favored stock as being better than about their prior nonfavored stock when winning the stock bet. They do not, however, report news about their prior favored stock as being worse than about their prior nonfavored stock when losing.
Our second hypothesis isolates motivated reasoning, which should cause people to scrutinize and distort undesirable information more than desirable information. 6 Hence, biases should be asymmetric such that they are greater for losses than gains.
If confirmatory bias were symmetric, reported news for the favored stock (nonfavored) would be positively (negatively) biased for both losses and gains equally. Hence, R2 above would remain true. Since these distortions should be more severe for losses than for gains we hypothesize that subjects should not perceive that their favored stock is doing worse (or that their nonfavored stock is doing better) when losing than 6 We should note that hypothesis 1 tests confirmation bias and motivated reasoning jointly. Specifically, motivated reasoning causes unequal evaluation of undesirable vs. desirable information whereas confirmatory bias bias applies to hypothesized vs. contrary information. Subjects both hypothesize that the favored stock will outperform the nonfavored stock and prefer it because of monetary gains. Our goal is to study these biases generally in an investment setting where they are often naturally conjoined. when winning. Hence, motivated reasoning implies the following:
• H2 : Subjects do not report news for their prior favored stock to be worse when losing than when winning the stock bet. Similarly, they do not report news for their nonfavored stock to be better when losing than when winning the stock bet.
Results
To address these hypotheses, we study the "valence" of news reported, i.e., the degree to which subjects characterized news positively. Specifically, we analyze the dependent variable, Newsvalence (non)favored, equal to 1 if good news was reported for the (non)favored stock prior to that week, 0 if neutral news was reported, and -1 if bad news was reported. Our results do not change materially if we add other measures of news valence such as the frequency of good or bad news reported separately. Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics for these variables. The average of newsvalence for both the favored and nonfavored stocks were significantly greater than zero.
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This outcome results from the fact that the majority of news reports were characterized as good news for both the favored (61.2%) and the nonfavored stocks (62.8%) whereas only a small fraction were characterized as bad news for the favored (7.6%) and nonfavored (8.5%).
All differences in this paper are computed as the average across subjects of the difference between two time-series averages for each subject. The objective is again 7 We should point out that the number of subject observations, N , varies across averages. For example, N for the newsvalence averages in panel A is equal to 80 and 78 for the favored and nonfavored stocks, respectively, which is less than the total number of subjects in our sample of 96. This discrepancy comes from the fact that these averages include only subjects who played the stock bet and reported news for these stocks. We have tried an alternative measure of news valence to capture more observations, in which "no news" is coded as neutral news. Our results again do not change materially with this alternative measure. Similar reductions in N occur with conditional averages in subsequent results since these averages include only subjects for whom these events occurred.
to eliminate correlations within subject observations across weeks and produce one observation per subject so we can employ standard t-tests. In addition, all averages conditional on winning or losing and returns are based on outcomes for the entire return week (and not until the subject's final decision point).
We start by discussing hypothesis 2, which we address by examining average differences in news reporting between winning and losing weeks for the stock bet in panel C of table 3. Our results indicate that subjects engaged in a high degree of motivated reasoning regarding their favored but not their nonfavored stock. Namely, we obtain the surprising result that newsvalence favored for winning minus losing weeks is negative and significant at p < 5%. Subjects in our experiment scrutinized undesirable information to such an extent that they actually perceived news for their favored stock to be better when losing than when winning the bet even though rational information processing dictates the opposite. We find no evidence of motivated reasoning for the nonfavored stock, however, since subjects reported news about this stock to be significantly better for losses than wins. This finding is consistent with rationality (R2) since the nonfavored stock does better, on average, when losing than when winning the bet.
We then study differences in news reporting between the favored and nonfavored stocks to address hypothesis 1. We do not find support for hypothesis 1 from our results in panel B of table 3. Specifically, the average difference of newsvalence for the favored minus the nonfavored stock is insignificant conditional both on winning and losing. This set of findings is, in fact, consistent with motivated reasoning 8 We should point out the fact that the average differences are slightly different than the average of the differences in Panel C of table 3. For example, the average difference between newsvalence for the favored and nonfavored stocks conditional on losing the bet is zero while the average newsvalence for the favored and nonfavored stocks conditional on losing are 0.61 and 0.72, respectively. Again, the reason for the discrepancy is the fact that the former average includes only subjects who reported news for both the favored and nonfavored stocks while the latter averages include subjects who reported news for only one.
applied to the favored stock. Our results from table 3 are depicted graphically in figure 4 . Although subjects reported marginally better news for the favored than the nonfavored stock when winning, this difference is insignificant. Motivated reasoning causes people to be inattentive to desirable information. As a result, subjects do not discern a difference in news between the two stocks when winning. Motivated reasoning also causes subjects to positively distort news regarding the favored stock when losing. Hence, they once again report no difference in newsvalence between the stocks even though the favored stock was underperforming the nonfavored.
The absence of motivated reasoning for the nonfavored stock indicates that subjects may have framed their decision as choosing a good stock rather than avoiding a bad one. For this reason, they may have perceived an emotional stake in outcomes and information related only to their favored stock. Further evidence of motivated reasoning for the favored but not the nonfavored stock can be seen by examining how reported news was affected by actual new information as proxied by the return on the stock for that week.
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Subjects ought to report better news about a stock when it has positive than when it has negative returns, on average, if their information processing is rational. Our subjects did indeed report significantly better news about their nonfavored stock for positive than for negative returns. In other words, the average difference of newsvalence for the nonfavored stock between positive and negative returns is positive and highly significant at p < 1% in panel D of table 3. This difference is insignificant for the favored stock, however. Subjects' news reports, therefore, were 9 A neuropsychological study by Westen, et al. (2006) examines neural patterns in experimental subjects engaged in political reasoning and finds that motivated reasoning only occurs when people have a "strong emotional stake in the conclusions reached."
10 There may, in fact, be a mismatch between the tenor of news reported by the financial media and returns. For example, currently publicized information may have been impounded into prices in the past as indicated by the oft-cited wisdom, "buy on the rumor, sell on the news." We believe that returns are a reasonable proxy nonetheless for the tenor of new information to the extent that the financial press has strong incentives to produce timely information and also that subjects interpret "new information" as including information about returns. We thank Philip O'Connor for pointing out this fact. not sensitive to returns as a result of biases in the processing of information related to this stock.
These results demonstrate that standard confirmatory-type biases are not apparent in our experiment. Instead, motivated reasoning causes inattentiveness for gains and distortions for losses but only for "favored" assets.
Betting Persistence
We now attempt to address the issue of how the persistence of subjects' beliefs in their news reporting affects their actual investment behavior. We have found that subjects' view of new information about their prior favored stock became inflated for losses as a result of motivated reasoning. It could be that subjects simply posture to make themselves feel better in the face of a bad outcome and that they are unwilling to make actual decisions with economic stakes in line with this posturing.
It is difficult to specify precisely how subjects ought to bet in our game both with and without belief persistence biases. This behavior will depend upon the particular valuation model employed by the subject. Our benchmarks come from two types of inferences that have been observed in response to random series. The first is the hot-hand fallacy wherein short-run outcomes continue in the same direction as documented in studies such as Tversky and Gilovich (1989) . With this valuation model, subjects should be momentum traders, persisting in their positions after a gain and reversing them after a loss. The second type of inference is the gambler's fallacy whereby random outcomes mean-revert. With this model, subjects should be contrarians and trade in the opposite manner (e.g., Rapaport and Budescu, 1997).
We study the following two measures of betting persistence: prob samebet, the probability of betting on the same favored stock as the previous week, and amount samebet, the average amount bet on the same favored stock as the previous week. Specifically, we compute averages of the former variable by assigning a one to a given week if the favored stock is the same as the prior week and a zero if the favored stock changes.
The latter variable is equal to the stock bet allocation if the favored stock is the same and is equal to minus the stock bet allocation if it changes. Summary statistics for these variables across subjects are given in panel A of table 4. The average probability of betting on the prior favored stock is 64%, which is significantly greater than a 50% chance of repeating the same bet at p < 1%. The unconditional average of amount samebet is also positive and highly significant, indicating that subjects tended to persist in their bets in dollar terms as well.
Panel B of table 3 reports averages of betting persistence variables for winning and losing weeks as well as the difference between the two. We find that subjects tend to persist in their bets after winning while neither systematically persisting nor reversing after losing. Namely, prob samebet is significantly greater than 50% while amt samebet is significantly greater than zero conditional on winning. These variables are insignificant conditional on losing, however. In relation to previous findings, these results are consistent with a hot-hand or momentum model of returns with the addition of motivated reasoning. Namely, motivated reasoning mollifies subjects' tendency to reverse positions after losses as they scrutinize and dispute this information which is contrary to their preferences.
These results are novel since prior studies have only documented either the hothand or gambler's fallacy in response to random series as discussed previously. Our study adds the element that subjects are not only forecasting random outcomes but also responding to their own success and failure in these forecast. Our results suggest that self-perception issues alter inferences in these settings.
Self-Confidence
We have until this point studied belief persistence related to new information about assets. We now turn our attention to persistence in beliefs related to self and confidence in one's stock-picking ability. In particular, we study biased self-attribution or the documented tendency for people to attribute successes to ability and failures to bad luck. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), for example, feature this bias as the source of belief persistence and momentum in their model. If subjects learn their stock-picking ability over time as rational Bayesian updaters, their selfconfidence should increase in response to winning and decrease in response in losing as it does in the model of Gervais and Odean (2001).
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We conjecture that subjects' self-confidence should increase when winning the bet since they should attribute this success to their ability. Their self-confidence should not decrease, however, when losing the bet since they should attribute this failure to bad fortune. Hence, we have the following hypothesis:
• H3 : Subjects' confidence in winning the current stock bet will increase over the previous week when winning the prior bet but will not decrease when losing the prior bet.
Our first measure of subjects' confidence is their stated probability of winning the stock bet. Our second confidence variable attempts to measure confidence net of random chance by comparing the amount of the stock bet to that of the chance bet, which has a known probability of 50%. We name these confidence measures as follows:
• Confidence 1 : stated probability of winning the stock bet.
• Confidence 2 : stock bet allocation minus chance bet allocation.
Summary statistics for confidence variables and their changes from the prior week are given in panel A of table 5. Average changes in confidence over time were insignificant for all measures as indicated in this table. Panel B of table 5 reports average changes in confidence across subjects for weeks when each subject won and lost the stock bet in order to address hypothesis 3. We find no evidence in support of biased self-attribution in our data. Namely, the average changes in both confidence variables were insignificant conditional on winning the prior bet and significantly negative conditional on losing. In effect, we observe the opposite of self-attribution bias in our data in that confidence only decreases in response to losing. Our evidence is consis- Once again, we find no evidence of standard self-attribution bias as captured in models such as Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) . Our findings indicate that these models should be modified to focus more on motivated reasoning in inferences about assets instead of inferences about self.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have found that inferences in our experiment became positively biased for prior favored assets when subjects incurred losses, consistent with the concept of motivated reasoning from psychology. In addition, this distortion seems to have influenced investment behavior in our game. In contrast, we find no evidence of standard confirmatory or self-attribution biases as has been conjectured in behavioral finance models. There are a number of implications that can be extracted from our findings.
First, we found that subjects exhibited motivated reasoning only for their favored and not for their nonfavored stock. We conjecture, therefore, that investors adopt a passive frame toward assets that are avoided and an active frame for positions that are chosen or sought. Hence, investors may exhibit weaker attachments and cognitive biases for stocks sold from holdings than for stocks bought or sold short.
Our results may help explain certain documented patterns in markets and also suggest new predictions related to those patterns. For example, our results may be related to the fact that momentum is stronger for loser stocks than for winner stocks.
Although there is some evidence that short-sales constraints contribute to momentum in stock returns (e.g., Ali and Trombley (2005) ), several studies find that these costs do not fully account for the profitability of momentum strategies (e.g., Bushee and
Raedy (2005)). Our findings suggest that loser momentum may not be caused entirely by short-sales constraints, but that motivated reasoning may also contribute to slow incorporation of information for loser stocks. If this hypothesis is true, short-sellers should be reluctant to accept good news about their investments because it causes them to lose money. One way of testing this hypothesis, therefore, is to determine whether stocks with higher short interest exhibit greater underreaction to good news and momentum in the positive return direction.
Our findings also suggest avenues for future research. For example, existing theories of belief persistence such as Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) should be modified to account for motivated reasoning so that these biases are stronger for losses than gains. In addition, they should focus on inferences about assets rather than inferences about self. Finally, one would ideally like to connect behavioral models of preferences that generate underreaction as a result of the disposition effect (e.g., Grinblatt and Han (2005) ) to behavioral models of inference persistence. One significant challenge, however, would be to reconcile studies of inferences such as our own Stock Pairs are the pairs of stocks, on which subjects bet for the fall and spring semester studies. They were generated by matching the two stocks in the same quintile for their three-factor loadings and idiosyncratic volatility based on regressions of monthly returns from the prior sixty months of available data as well as the same 3-digit SIC code. N refers to the number of subjects betting on that pair for their stock bet. Stock, Chance, and Cash are the amounts allocated to the stock bet, chance bet, and cash, respectively where each unit is equal to $0.01. ∆Stock, ∆Chance, and ∆Cash are the changes in these variables between the current and prior weeks (for weeks [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . N refers to the number of subject observations used to compute each average. P-values are given in parentheses. Panel A presents summary statistics of news reporting variables. Statistics are computed across subjects on time-series averages of these variables for each subject. Newsvalence (non)favored has values 1,0, or -1 if good news, neutral news, or bad news was reported that week for the prior (non)favored stock, respectively. Panel B presents unconditional and conditional average differences in news reporting between the prior week's favored and nonfavored stocks. Each average is computed across subjects on the difference between two time-series averages for each subject. Win and Lose include only weeks where the subject won and lost the stock bet, respectively. Panel C presents average differences in news reporting between wins and losses for the stock bet and Panel D presents average differences in news reporting between positive and negative returns. Each average is computed across subjects on the difference between two time-series averages for each subject. N refers to the number of subject observations used to compute each average. P-values are given in parentheses. Newsvalence nonfavored 78 0.48*** 0.58 -1 1 (0) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents results for persistence of betting decisions as measured by prob samebet and amount samebet, where the former is equal to one and the latter is equal to the stock bet allocation if the favored stock was the same as the prior week while the former is zero and the latter is minus the stock bet allocation if the favored stock changed. Panel A reports summary statistics across subjects of time-series averages of betting persistence variables for each subject. Panel B reports averages of betting persistence variables for wins versus losses. Win and Lose are averages across subjects of time-series averages for weeks in which the subject won and lost the stock bet, respectively. N refers to the number of subject observations used to compute each average. P-values are given in parentheses, and prob samebet is tested against a null of 0.5. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents results for self-confidence in stock-picking ability. Confidence 1 is the subjects' stated probability of winning the stock bet while Confidence 2 is the stock bet allocation minus the chance bet allocation. ∆Confidence 1 and ∆Confidence 2 are the changes in these variables between the current and prior week (for weeks 2-6). Panel A reports summary statistics across subjects of time-series averages of confidence variables and their changes for each subject. Panel B reports averages of changes in confidence variables for wins versus losses. Win and Lose are averages across subjects of time-series averages for weeks in which the subject won and lost the stock bet, respectively. N refers to the number of subject observations used to compute each average. P-values are given in parentheses, and Confidence 1 is tested against a null of 50. 
